Windows security event logging

 

Windows Audit Logging

Accenture MxDR collects the contents of the Windows Audit Log for each of the Windows devices that you have enrolled with the service. All of the logs that are collected are archived within the MxDR platform for 12 months and some of them are used for security incident generation.

This document explains the minimum level of Windows logging that MxDR requires for effective incident generation to allow you to configure an appropriate audit policy on your enrolled Windows devices.

Basic and Advanced Audit Policy

  • In Windows versions after Vista/2008 you have the choice of applying a Basic Audit Policy or an Advanced Audit Policy.

  • Using a Basic Audit Policy you can enable or disable logging for nine high level categories of activity. With an Advanced Audit Policy each category is further broken into subcategories, which can each have logging enabled or disabled individually, allowing more control of what is logged.

For example, in the Basic Audit Policy you can enable logging for the category Account Logon. In an Advanced Audit Policy you can choose to enable logging individually for the following subcategories within Account Logon

  • Credential Validation

  • Kerberos Authentication Service

  • Kerberos Service Ticket Operations

  • Other Account Logon Events

Windows Security Events

Each subcategory will enable or disable logging for multiple Windows Security Events. For example, enabling auditing for the Logon subcategory causes the following Windows Security Events to be recorded

  • 4624(S): An account was successfully logged on.

  • 4625(F): An account failed to log on.

  • 4648(S): A logon was attempted using explicit credentials.

  • 4675(S): SIDs were filtered.

Log Volumes

Enabling logging for some audit categories or subcategories may generate a substantial number of logs, potentially more than can be effectively processed by your logging architecture. Therefore we have identified the subcategories that are most valuable for incident generation and request that you enable these as a minimum."

Valuable subcategories for Incident Generation

For incident generation, MxDR recommends enabling logging both success and failures for the following subcategories.

Category

Subcategory

Volume (per Microsoft)

MITRE ATT&CK

Account Logon

Credential Validation

High (DCs), Low (others)

TA0001 – Initial Access

TA0002 - Execution

TA0004 – Privilege Escalation

TA0005 – Defense Evasion

TA0007 – Discovery

T1059 - Command and Scripting Interpreter

T1078 - Valid Accounts

T1087 – Account Discovery

T1114 – Email Collection

T1550 – Use Alternate Authentication Material

Kerberos Authentication Service

High (Kerberos KDCs)

TA0001 – Initial Access

TA0006 – Credential Access

TA0004 – Privilege Escalation

T1110 – Brute Force

T1187 – Forced Authentication

T1212 – Exploitation for Credential Access

Kerberos Service Ticket Operations

Very High (Kerberos KDCs)

TA0006 – Credential Access

T1550 - Use Alternate Authentication Material

T1558 – Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets

Account Management

Computer Account Management

Low

TA0004 – Privilege Escalation

TA0006 – Credential Access

T1068 - Exploitation for Privilege Escalation

T1207 – Rogue Domain Controller

Other Account Management Events

Low

TA0003 – Persistence

TA0004 – Privilege Escalation

T1036 - Masquerading

T1078 - Valid Accounts

T1550 - Use Alternate Authentication Material

Security Group Management

Low

TA0003 – Persistence

TA0002 – Execution

TA0004 – Privilege Escalation

TA0005 – Defense Evasion

T1027 - Obfuscated Files or Information

T1036 - Masquerading

T1053 – Scheduled Task/Job

T1059 - Command and Scripting Interpreter

T1078 - Valid Accounts

T1098 – Account Manipulation

User Account Management

Low

TA0003 – Persistence

TA0004 – Privilege Escalation

TA0005 – Defense Evasion

TA0006 – Credential Access

T1036 - Masquerading

T1098 – Account Manipulation

T1134 - Access Token Manipulation

T1136 - Create Account

T1212 – Exploitation for Credential Access

T1562 - Impair Defenses

Detailed Tracking

DPAPI Activity

Low

TA0006 – Credential Access

T1003 – OS Credential Dumping

PNP Activity

Typically Low

TA0008 – Lateral Movement

T1569 – System Services

Process Creation

Medium or High

TA0002 – Execution

TA0003 – Persistence

TA0004 – Privilege Escalation

TA0005 – Defense Evasion

TA0006 – Credential Access

TA0007 – Discovery

TA0008 – Lateral Movement

Process Termination

Low or Medium

TA0007 – Discovery

T1016 - System Network Configuration Discovery

T1018 – Remote System Discovery

T1482 – Domain Trust Discovery

DS Access

Directory Service Access

High (AD Domain Services)

TA0003 - Persistence

TA0004 – Privilege Escalation

TA0006 – Credential Access

TA0007 – Discovery

T1003 – OS Credential Dumping

T1069 – Permission Groups Discovery

T1087 – Account Discovery

T1222 – File and Directory Permissions Modification

T1546 – Event Triggered Execution

Directory Service Changes

Medium (DCs)

TA0003 – Persistence

TA0011 – Command and Control

T1001 – Data Obfuscation

T1098 – Account Manipulation

T1207 – Rogue Domain Controller

Logon/Logoff

Account Lockout

Low

T1110 – Brute Force

Group Membership

Medium (DCs), Low (others)

TA0003 – Persistence

TA0004 – Privilege Escalation

TA0005 – Defense Evasion

TA0006 – Credential Access

T1036 - Masquerading

T1098 – Account Manipulation

T1134 - Access Token Manipulation

T1212 – Exploitation for Credential Access

Logoff

High

TA0001 – Initial Access

TA0004 – Privilege Escalation

TA0008 – Lateral Movement

T1078 - Valid Accounts

T1110 – Brute Force

Logon

Medium (DCs), Low (others)

TA0001 – Initial Access

TA0002 – Execution

TA0003 – Persistence

TA0004 – Privilege Escalation

TA0005 – Defense Evasion

TA0006 – Credential Access

TA0007 – Discovery

TA0008 – Lateral Movement

T1021 – Remote Services

T1047 – Windows Management Instrumentation

T1059 – Command and Scripting Interpreter

T1078 – Valid Accounts

T1187 – Forced Authentication

T1110 – Brute Force

T1114 – Email Collection

T1133 – External Remote Services

T1190 – Exploit Public Facing Application

T1210 – Exploitation of Remote Services

T1546 – Event Triggered Execution

T1550 – Use Alternate Authentication Material

Other Login/Logoff Events

Low

TA0008 – Lateral Movement

T1078 - Valid Accounts

T1550 - Use Alternate Authentication Material

T1558 – Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets

Special Logon

Medium (DCs), Low (others)

TA0004 – Privilege Escalation

TA0008 – Lateral Movement

T1078 - Valid Accounts

Object Access

Certification Services

Medium or Low (AD Cert Services servers)

TA0004 – Privilege Escalation

TA0006 – Credential Access

Detailed File Share

High (File Servers & DCs) Low (others)

TA0002 – Execution

TA0003 - Persistence

TA0005 – Defense Evasion

TA0006 – Credential Access

TA0007 – Discovery

TA0008 – Lateral Movement

TA0009 – Collection

T1003 – OS Credential Dumping

T1012 – Query Registry

T1021 – Remote Services

T1039 – Data from Network Shared Drive

T1053 – Scheduled Task/Job

T1112 – Modify Registry

T1187 – Forced Authentication

T1212 – Exploitation for Credential Access

T1547 – Boot or Logon Autostart Execution

T1552 – Unsecured Credentials

T1569 – System Services

File Share

High (File Servers & DCs) Low (others)

TA0008 – Lateral Movement

T1021 – Remote Services

Filtering Platform Connection

High

TA0005 – Defense Evasion

TA0007 – Discovery

TA0008 – Lateral Movement

TA0010 - Exfiltration

TA0011 – Command and Control

T1021 – Remote Services

T1059 – Command and Scripting Interpreter

T1087 – Account Discovery

T1090 - Proxy

T1558 – Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets

Filtering Platform Packet Drop

High

Other Object Access Events

Low

TA0002 – Execution

TA0003 - Persistence

TA0004 – Privilege Escalation

TA0005 – Defense Evasion

T1053 – Scheduled Task/Job

T1112 – Modify Registry

T1543 – Create or Modify System Process

Registry

Medium or Low

TA0001 – Initial Access

TA0005 – Defense Evasion

TA0006 – Credential Access

TA0007 – Discovery

TA0008 – Lateral Movement

TA0009 - Collection

TA0040 - Impact

T1003 - OS Credential Dumping

T1110 – Brute Force

T1012 – Query Registry

T1021 – Remote Services

T1027 - Obfuscated Files or Information

T1112 – Modify Registry

T1123 – Audio Capture

T1485 – Data Destruction

T1486 – Data Encrypted for Impact

T1487 – Disc Structure Wipe

T1552 – Unsecured Credentials

T1553 – Subvert Trust Controls

T1562 – Impair Defenses

Removable Storage

Not Listed

TA0001 – Initial Access

T1025 – Data from Removable Media

T1052 – Exfiltration Over Physical Medium

T1091 – Replication Through Removable Media

Policy Change

Audit Policy Change

Low

TA0005 – Defense Evasion

TA0006 – Credential Access

T1003 - OS Credential Dumping

T1562 – Impair Defenses

Authentication Policy Change

Low

TA0006 – Credential Access

T1098 – Account Manipulation

Filtering Platform Policy Change

Not Listed

TA0005 – Defense Evasion

T1562 – Impair Defenses

Privilege Use

Sensitive Privilege Use

High

TA0002 – Execution

TA0004 – Privilege Escalation

TA0005 – Defense Evasion

TA0008 – Lateral Movement

T1021 – Remote Services

T1059 - Command and Scripting Interpreter

1548 - Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism

1558 - Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism

T1562 – Impair Defenses

System

Other System Events

Low

TA0008 – Lateral Movement

T1021 – Remote Services

Security System Extension

Low

TA0002 – Execution

TA0003 - Persistence

TA0004 – Privilege Escalation

TA0005 – Defense Evasion

TA0006 – Credential Access

TA0008 – Lateral Movement

TA0010 – Exfiltration

T1003 - OS Credential Dumping

T1021 – Remote Services

T1027 - Obfuscated Files or Information

T1048 - Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol

T1059 – Command and Scripting Interpreter

T1134 - Access Token Manipulation

T1543 - Create or Modify System Process

T1554 - Compromise Client Software Binary

T1569 - System Services

T1570 - Lateral Tool Transfer

System Integrity

Low

TA0005 – Defense Evasion

T1027 - Obfuscated Files or Information

Command Line Process Auditing

Enabling the “Process Creation” subcategory causes the creation of new processes to be logged to the audit log. The information available in this log can be significantly enhanced by enabling Command Line Auditing so that the command/filename that caused the new process to be created is captured.

To enable this :

  • Ensure that Audit Process Creation is enabled in the Advanced Audit Policy

  • Edit the group policy “Computer Configuration > Administrative Templates > System > Audit Process Creation” to enable “Include command line in process creation event”

  • Security Event ID 4688 should now include the process command line

Windows Powershell Logging

Windows Powershell Logging provides important information about suspicious or malicious Powershell commands. Logging for Powershell is not configured via the Audit Policy but via a separate group policy for Powershell.

To enable this:

Edit the group policy “Administrative Templates > Windows Components > Windows Powershell” to enable the following settings

Setting

What it records

Volume

Reason for logging

Module Logging

Pipeline execution

Very High

TA0002 – Execution
TA0003 - Persistence
TA0004 – Privilege Escalation
TA0005 – Defense Evasion
TA0006 – Credential Access
TA0007 – Discovery
TA0008 – Lateral Movement
TA0009 - Collection

Script Block Logging

All code blocks executed

Medium

Audit logs for archiving

In addition to the audit subcategories considered most valuable for incident generation, there are other subcategories you may wish to send to MxDR to store and include in incidents.

Please review your own audit/compliance requirements and information from Microsoft below about the available audit information and enable logging for the subcategories you think are appropriate.

 

Further Information

Advanced Security Audit Policies

https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/advanced-security-auditing

Advanced Security Audit Policy Settings

https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/advanced-security-audit-policy-settings

Detailed information about defining an Audit Policy

https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/planning-and-deploying-advanced-security-audit-policies

Command Line Process Auditing

https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/ad-ds/manage/component-updates/command-line-process-auditing

 

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